Community Governance
Address by Dr Marilyn Waring to SOLGM 2001:
Absolutely Positively Local Government:
Best practice for local government in the new millennium
Wellington. September 10, 2001
Karanga mai, mihi mai Tena koutou. tena koutou katoa
Taupiri te maunga, Waikato te awa
te Waring, Rumney, Murphy, McSweeney te whanau, te iwi pakeha.
Best practice calls for transparency. I feel compelled to disclose that I am a resident and rate payer in the Rodney Council area.
I want to start with a story I have followed keenly over the years. It is deliberately not a New Zealand story, but I believe it has some key messages for major features of best practice in community governance. It is also a development project story. It is from the field of the development assistance projects that some of the best writing and theorising, if not the best practice, has emerged on community participation and governance. But this story is a chronicle of bad practice.
The Pak Mun Dam was built on the Mun River, 5.5km upstream from its confluence with the Mekong, in the province of Ubon Ratchathani, in Northeast Thailand. The Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) built and operated the dam as a run-of-the-river hydropower plant.
When the Environmental Impact Studies conducted in 1982 indicated that approximately 4 000 households would be displaced at the suggested water level, an alternative design was agreed upon in 1985. The relocation of the dam site significantly minimised the extent of displacement to an estimated 248 households.
The original project design was further modified by relocating the dam 1.5km upstream to avoid the submergence of Kaeng Tana rapids, an important environmental and tourist site. However a new environmental impact assessment (EIA) which may have identified and anticipated some of the new environmental impacts arising from the new location was not conducted .
BEST PRACTICE WOULD MEAN THAT WHEN YOU MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE OR MAJOR MODIFICATION TO A PROJECT, AND ESPECIALLY PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION, BEGIN A NEW ROUND OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, ENVIRONMENTAL AND CULTURAL IMPACT ASSESSMENTS.
The Pak Mun dam is located at the end of a large watershed where rainfall and run off vary considerably between dry and wet seasons. During wet months Pak Mun can turbine the daily inflow to serve the 4 hour peak demand and in addition can generate power in off-peak hours with surplus water available. However during the dry months the plant cannot produce its full rated capacity for the 4 hour peak demand due to insufficient water. The output of the plant depends on the water level in the reservoir and the tailwater level. The Pak Mun Dam's power production peaks in the wet season when it is least needed in the power system and is lowest in the dry season when it is most needed.
STRATEGIC POLICIES, AND LONG TERM PLANS, ARE FOR ALL SEASONS.
The World Banki and EGAT did the figures for the project. They chose a replacement cost method, asking what gas turbine capacity would be needed to replace the assumed hydro generation. The actual dependable capacity of the Pak Mun project calculated from daily power output between 1995-98 assuming that all available power gets assigned to a 4 hour peak demand period is only 21 MW. This 21 MW is what the Pak Mun project offsets in gas turbine capacity. However the value of alternative generating capacity adopted for comparative purposes by EGAT and sanctioned by the World Bank was much higher at 150 MW. Even when the benefits of the ancillary electricity net support of the dam and the green house gasses reduction benefit of the dam were included in the evaluation of the dam, they were not sufficient to make the project economically justifiable.
THERE IS NOTHING SPECIAL OR MORE IMPORTANT ABOUT THE ECONOMIC OR COST BENEFIT ANALYSES COMPARED WITH ENVIRONMENTAL, CULTURAL AND SOCIAL IMPACTS. ECONOMICS IS A SOCIAL SCIENCE TOO. SELECTING QUANTITATIVE DATA IN THE HOPE THAT MOST FOLKS WILL JUST BE VERY IMPRESSED BUT NOT KNOW ENOUGH TO QUESTION IT IS WORST PRACTICE.
The Pak Mun project was presented as a multi-purpose development project for hydropower, irrigation and fisheries. The irrigation benefits of a run of river project were always doubtful The EIA predicted that fish production from the reservoir would increase considerably, though some fish species might be affected by the blockage of river flows by the dam. However, run-of-the-river reservoirs cannot sustain such high yields, as they do not provide the appropriate habitat for pelagic fish species. The World Bank projected a yield of 100 kg/ha/year for the reservoir. A more realistic estimate would have been around 10 kg/ha/year. After the completion of Pak Mun dam, the lower Mun River experienced a decline in fishing yields of an estimated value of US$ 1.4 million per annum.
SOMEONE WHO HAS LIVED ON THE BANK OF THE RIVER AS A SUBSISTENCE FISHERMAN, EVEN WHEN HE OR SHE IS ILLITERATE, IS THE EXPERT ON FISH AT THAT POINT IN THE RIVER. HE WILL ALWAYS NO MORE THAN THE DEPARTMENTAL SCIENTIST FROM BANGKOK AND THE WORLD BANK CONSULTANT FROM CORNELL.
Of the 265 fish species recorded in the Mun-Chi watershed before 1994, 77 species were migratory and 35 species were dependent on habitat associated with rapids. Available evidence does not indicate disappearance of any species before 1990, and nearly all species are very common ones to the region. The latest survey recorded 96 species in the upstream region. At least 50 species of rapid dependent fish have disappeared. The fish catch directly upstream of the dam has declined by 60-80% after the completion of the project.
There are divergent views on the extent that the decline in fish species could be attributed solely to the dam. The difference in number of species in fish surveys before and after dam construction may well be exacerbated by the cumulative impact of many different developments in the watershed. These include: water resources and hydropower development in Chi-Mun river watershed, deforestation, domestic waste water discharge, agriculture intensification and development, fisheries, industrial waste water discharge, saline soils and enforcement of water quality standards and classification.
NOTHING HAPPENS IN ISOLATION. CROSS CUTTING CROSS SECTORAL ANALYSES ARE VITAL BEST PRACTICE.
The Environmental Planning Survey predicted 241 households as displaced
people. The actual number of households displaced by Pak Mun dam was 1,700. Unpredicted by any of the appraisal documents, a large number of households were adversely affected due to declining fishing yields. Until March 2000, 6,202 households were compensated for loss in fisheries during the 3-year construction period. Compensation for the permanent loss of fisheries has not been given.
OUTCOMES, NOT OUTPUTS, ARE THE STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES FOR WELL BEING.
Villagers who were dependent on fisheries for cash income have found no viable means of livelihood since the dam was built, despite efforts to provide training opportunities. As their food security and incomes destabilised they sought various ways to cope including out migration to urban areas in search of wage labour. Some households had to settle in forest reserve areas or on other common property as the compensation money was insufficient to buy alternate land. Next to fisheries, loss of access to common property such as forest and grazing land has been among the other adverse impacts. Forests and riverbank dry season gardens were not compensated. The project resulted in the loss of riverbank vegetation, natural forest and community forest. In the pre-project period, the women in the community harvested 40 edible plants,10 bamboo species and 45 mushroom species for household subsistence and small income. A number of medicinal plants were also found near the Mun riverbank. Loss of these plants and vegetation through inundation had implications for biodiversity and household food security. These aspects were overlooked.
GROWTH DOES NOT MEAN THE SAME AS DEVELOPMENT. EVERY POLICY IMPACTS ON THE UNPAID PRODUCTION AND SERVICE SECTOR OF A COMMUNITY. IT IS THE LARGEST ECONOMIC SECTOR IN ANY NATION’S ECONOMY. IT MUST BE VISIBLE AS SUCH.
Since the beginning of the Pak Mun project conflicts of ideas and interests arose between those who opposed the dam and the leaders and headmen group. The conflict was intensified during protests and demonstrations for compensation. Those who were opposing the dam were often discriminated against. The conflict over the dam project at the local level created mistrust and deep social rifts.
‘COMMUNITY LEADERS’ AND KEY STAKEHOLDERS’ DO NOT EQUAL ‘COMMUNITY CONSULTATION’.
No study ever predicted that fisheries issues would become problematic, during construction or implementation, though the community attempted to raise the issue with the World Bank as early as October 1991 and prior to that with EGAT. The project authorities considered that it was not possible to determine the number of fishermen actually affected or the extent of loss suffered and there was a perception of exaggerated and ever-increasing claims for compensation. The absence of a proper baseline meant that claims for compensation by a large number of families would not be considered legitimate which meant that the only possible recourse for the affected villagers was prolonged protest.
Thus, the Pak Mun project became mired in a protracted process of conflict between the adversely-affected villagers, the project developers and the Government. Exclusion of affected people from the decision-making process gave rise to protracted protests, demonstrations and confrontations. These actions were taken in order to seek recognition and settlement of compensation and rehabilitation entitlements. This resulted in a very strong negative perception within the community for the project.
Community Governance
Address by Dr Marilyn Waring to SOLGM 2001:
Absolutely Positively Local Government:
Best practice for local government in the new millennium
Wellington. September 10, 2001
Karanga mai, mihi mai Tena koutou. tena koutou katoa
Taupiri te maunga, Waikato te awa
te Waring, Rumney, Murphy, McSweeney te whanau, te iwi pakeha.
Best practice calls for transparency. I feel compelled to disclose that I am a resident and rate payer in the Rodney Council area.
I want to start with a story I have followed keenly over the years. It is deliberately not a New Zealand story, but I believe it has some key messages for major features of best practice in community governance. It is also a development project story. It is from the field of the development assistance projects that some of the best writing and theorising, if not the best practice, has emerged on community participation and governance. But this story is a chronicle of bad practice.
The Pak Mun Dam was built on the Mun River, 5.5km upstream from its confluence with the Mekong, in the province of Ubon Ratchathani, in Northeast Thailand. The Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) built and operated the dam as a run-of-the-river hydropower plant.
When the Environmental Impact Studies conducted in 1982 indicated that approximately 4 000 households would be displaced at the suggested water level, an alternative design was agreed upon in 1985. The relocation of the dam site significantly minimised the extent of displacement to an estimated 248 households.
The original project design was further modified by relocating the dam 1.5km upstream to avoid the submergence of Kaeng Tana rapids, an important environmental and tourist site. However a new environmental impact assessment (EIA) which may have identified and anticipated some of the new environmental impacts arising from the new location was not conducted .
BEST PRACTICE WOULD MEAN THAT WHEN YOU MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE OR MAJOR MODIFICATION TO A PROJECT, AND ESPECIALLY PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION, BEGIN A NEW ROUND OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, ENVIRONMENTAL AND CULTURAL IMPACT ASSESSMENTS.
The Pak Mun dam is located at the end of a large watershed where rainfall and run off vary considerably between dry and wet seasons. During wet months Pak Mun can turbine the daily inflow to serve the 4 hour peak demand and in addition can generate power in off-peak hours with surplus water available. However during the dry months the plant cannot produce its full rated capacity for the 4 hour peak demand due to insufficient water. The output of the plant depends on the water level in the reservoir and the tailwater level. The Pak Mun Dam's power production peaks in the wet season when it is least needed in the power system and is lowest in the dry season when it is most needed.
STRATEGIC POLICIES, AND LONG TERM PLANS, ARE FOR ALL SEASONS.
The World Banki and EGAT did the figures for the project. They chose a replacement cost method, asking what gas turbine capacity would be needed to replace the assumed hydro generation. The actual dependable capacity of the Pak Mun project calculated from daily power output between 1995-98 assuming that all available power gets assigned to a 4 hour peak demand period is only 21 MW. This 21 MW is what the Pak Mun project offsets in gas turbine capacity. However the value of alternative generating capacity adopted for comparative purposes by EGAT and sanctioned by the World Bank was much higher at 150 MW. Even when the benefits of the ancillary electricity net support of the dam and the green house gasses reduction benefit of the dam were included in the evaluation of the dam, they were not sufficient to make the project economically justifiable.
THERE IS NOTHING SPECIAL OR MORE IMPORTANT ABOUT THE ECONOMIC OR COST BENEFIT ANALYSES COMPARED WITH ENVIRONMENTAL, CULTURAL AND SOCIAL IMPACTS. ECONOMICS IS A SOCIAL SCIENCE TOO. SELECTING QUANTITATIVE DATA IN THE HOPE THAT MOST FOLKS WILL JUST BE VERY IMPRESSED BUT NOT KNOW ENOUGH TO QUESTION IT IS WORST PRACTICE.
The Pak Mun project was presented as a multi-purpose development project for hydropower, irrigation and fisheries. The irrigation benefits of a run of river project were always doubtful The EIA predicted that fish production from the reservoir would increase considerably, though some fish species might be affected by the blockage of river flows by the dam. However, run-of-the-river reservoirs cannot sustain such high yields, as they do not provide the appropriate habitat for pelagic fish species. The World Bank projected a yield of 100 kg/ha/year for the reservoir. A more realistic estimate would have been around 10 kg/ha/year. After the completion of Pak Mun dam, the lower Mun River experienced a decline in fishing yields of an estimated value of US$ 1.4 million per annum.
SOMEONE WHO HAS LIVED ON THE BANK OF THE RIVER AS A SUBSISTENCE FISHERMAN, EVEN WHEN HE OR SHE IS ILLITERATE, IS THE EXPERT ON FISH AT THAT POINT IN THE RIVER. HE WILL ALWAYS NO MORE THAN THE DEPARTMENTAL SCIENTIST FROM BANGKOK AND THE WORLD BANK CONSULTANT FROM CORNELL.
Of the 265 fish species recorded in the Mun-Chi watershed before 1994, 77 species were migratory and 35 species were dependent on habitat associated with rapids. Available evidence does not indicate disappearance of any species before 1990, and nearly all species are very common ones to the region. The latest survey recorded 96 species in the upstream region. At least 50 species of rapid dependent fish have disappeared. The fish catch directly upstream of the dam has declined by 60-80% after the completion of the project.
There are divergent views on the extent that the decline in fish species could be attributed solely to the dam. The difference in number of species in fish surveys before and after dam construction may well be exacerbated by the cumulative impact of many different developments in the watershed. These include: water resources and hydropower development in Chi-Mun river watershed, deforestation, domestic waste water discharge, agriculture intensification and development, fisheries, industrial waste water discharge, saline soils and enforcement of water quality standards and classification.
NOTHING HAPPENS IN ISOLATION. CROSS CUTTING CROSS SECTORAL ANALYSES ARE VITAL BEST PRACTICE.
The Environmental Planning Survey predicted 241 households as displaced people. The actual number of households displaced by Pak Mun dam was 1,700. Unpredicted by any of the appraisal documents, a large number of households were adversely affected due to declining fishing yields. Until March 2000, 6,202 households were compensated for loss in fisheries during the 3-year construction period. Compensation for the permanent loss of fisheries has not been given.
OUTCOMES, NOT OUTPUTS, ARE THE STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES FOR WELL BEING.
Villagers who were dependent on fisheries for cash income have found no viable means of livelihood since the dam was built, despite efforts to provide training opportunities. As their food security and incomes destabilised they sought various ways to cope including out migration to urban areas in search of wage labour. Some households had to settle in forest reserve areas or on other common property as the compensation money was insufficient to buy alternate land. Next to fisheries, loss of access to common property such as forest and grazing land has been among the other adverse impacts. Forests and riverbank dry season gardens were not compensated. The project resulted in the loss of riverbank vegetation, natural forest and community forest. In the pre-project period, the women in the community harvested 40 edible plants,10 bamboo species and 45 mushroom species for household subsistence and small income. A number of medicinal plants were also found near the Mun riverbank. Loss of these plants and vegetation through inundation had implications for biodiversity and household food security. These aspects were overlooked.
GROWTH DOES NOT MEAN THE SAME AS DEVELOPMENT. EVERY POLICY IMPACTS ON THE UNPAID PRODUCTION AND SERVICE SECTOR OF A COMMUNITY. IT IS THE LARGEST ECONOMIC SECTOR IN ANY NATION’S ECONOMY. IT MUST BE VISIBLE AS SUCH.
Since the beginning of the Pak Mun project conflicts of ideas and interests arose between those who opposed the dam and the leaders and headmen group. The conflict was intensified during protests and demonstrations for compensation. Those who were opposing the dam were often discriminated against. The conflict over the dam project at the local level created mistrust and deep social rifts.
‘COMMUNITY LEADERS’ AND KEY STAKEHOLDERS’ DO NOT EQUAL ‘COMMUNITY CONSULTATION’.
No study ever predicted that fisheries issues would become problematic, during construction or implementation, though the community attempted to raise the issue with the World Bank as early as October 1991 and prior to that with EGAT. The project authorities considered that it was not possible to determine the number of fishermen actually affected or the extent of loss suffered and there was a perception of exaggerated and ever-increasing claims for compensation. The absence of a proper baseline meant that claims for compensation by a large number of families would not be considered legitimate which meant that the only possible recourse for the affected villagers was prolonged protest.
Thus, the Pak Mun project became mired in a protracted process of conflict between the adversely-affected villagers, the project developers and the Government. Exclusion of affected people from the decision-making process gave rise to protracted protests, demonstrations and confrontations. These actions were taken in order to seek recognition and settlement of compensation and rehabilitation entitlements. This resulted in a very strong negative perception within the community for the project.
COMMUNITY OWNERSHIP IS VITAL.
After resettlement, villagers have witnessed many social and cultural problems. The new social arrangements have disrupted former social relations and changed patterns of interaction among the villagers. In the past the Mun river served as the stage for their social life. The river was where villagers met, interacted, and developed social networks of exchange. The traditional communal ceremony had usually been organized on the riverbank, but now could not be held due to the submergence of the ceremonial site and, in part, due to the social disintegration of the communities.
OF COURSE THERE ARE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL OUTCOMES.
Affected villagers were not consulted at the early stages of the decision-making process and there were no attempts to include them in the decision making on the project or the mitigation measures. The issues around inadequate assessment of impacts and compensation were not addressed at the outset. Negotiation on compensation began only after long protests by the affected community and NGOs. If plans and policies were adequately implemented with respect to social impacts and resolution of conflicts, villagers would not have had to waste time and effort in negotiating and protesting against the dam. Nor would the country as a whole have lost an important ecosystem. And on my visit to the region six weeks ago, I learned that the generation of power from the Pak Mun dam had been halted.
COMMUNITY GOVERNANCE IS COST EFFECTIVE.
At the heart of community governance lies the nature of democracy. I spoke of this at the Local Government Conference in Auckland in 1999, and I make no apology for emphasing some of those points again.
The democrat must show great rationality and moderation and respect for others -she or he is an exceptional social product, an elitist who works within democratic institutions to preserve their purity, and at best ensure their survival.
The democrat Councilor knows that the task of governance involves policy and strategic planning, and objects to the attempts by colleagues to meddle in management. The democrat manager knows that democracy is always pluralist, and objects to attempts to proceed without hearing diverse views.
As a principle democracy is a basic right of any citizen. The rights should be exercised with full regard to freedom, equality, transparency and responsibility.
The democratic process is a constant condition; democracy encompasses methods, substance and substantive outcomes. Democracy, as process, as a condition, and as an outcome, is a part of the same continuum. What distinguishes each component is the right of popular participation at all stages. It presupposes transparency. By transparency we don’t simply mean the ability to evaluate what has gone on after an event. We expect transparency at all stages of the process, governed by a sense of ethics and norms, in procedures that are in themselves ethical.
People have a right to a controlling influence over public decisions and over decision makers- not simply as a matter of convention, but as a result of the contributions that they make. In particular, whenever people organise collectively to solve their problems to protect or promote their interests, to persuade fellow citizens to their point of view or to openly influence policy, this can be seen as much as an expression of democracy as the arrangements of the particular form of government.
Facilitating and enabling people’s own capacity for self organisation to meet their economic needs in their local communities also serves democratic goals. Although the operation of all parts of the democratic process can be costly, the costs of not providing access can be much higher. Where local government is open and accountable, damaging policies can be identified before they become chronic. The use of public resources can be efficiently and effectively monitored and local government policies can be made responsive to public need. I should point out that the Controller and Auditor General agrees with this point of view.. When discussing the VALUE of public consultation he concluded:
“the most tangible benefit of adequate and appropriate public consultation is that it will help produce better decisions. Informed policy decisions are more likely to avoid constant review and revision. Projects that are understood and accepted by the community are less likely to face pressure for their revision or removal. Good consultation can produce better sustainable decisions. Getting it right the first time could save time and money.”
However the Controller and Auditor General also found there was a ‘perception’ that the special consultative procedures under section 716A of the Local Government Act 1974 were problematic. It was highlighted in the ‘Public Consultation and Decision Making Report’ that the public often perceived the consultation process as inadequate and inappropriate - a sham. The public questioned the vested interests of council officers and councilors, suggested there was often an unwillingness of local authorities to listen, a lack of time for preparation and presentation of submissions and sometimes avoidance of decision making on the part of councils.
Now the proposed legislation will just advance the existing special consultative procedure as the basis for consultation. Public make submissions at a council meeting open to the public. These may be supplemented by each council’s own consultation policy. Given the feed back in the Controller and Auditor General’s report, it is problematic to me that Councilors might perceive that their only consultation requirements are those required by statute.
For this reason if I am thinking about good community governance and best practice I have some disquiet about the powers of general competence: They are not those voiced by Murray McCully at the recent Local Government conference: they are about the councilors deciding or proscribing even the parameters of general competence without consultation: thinking they are the experts as opposed to just the representatives: thinking that they must lead instead of listen, thinking that they will predetermine the process rather than engage in consultation about what the processes might be.
Councils will be able to do anything within the law to achieve the proposed purpose of local government, provided it has consulted with the local community first – and that means consulting with the community first to determine the process and the parameters.
For the last decade ‘good governance has been a funding favourite in the international development business. This is mostly because donors want to maintain some pressure on human rights, but can’t say that because it appears to be interference in domestic affairs. Whatever the impetus, there has been some good thinking about the challenges of good governance.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) says good governance is “…participatory, transparent and accountable. It is also effective and equitable. And it promotes the rule of law. Good governance ensures that political, social and economic priorities are based on broad consensus in society and that the voices of the poorest and the most vulnerable are heard in decision-making over the allocation of development resources”.
Good governance applies at all levels of society and therefore goes further than just “good government”. It is a process which depends on close consultation and cooperation. It involves neither the exporting of ideologies, nor the imposing of one culture’s values on another.
Its not my experience that the voices of the poorest and most vulnerable are expressed in submissions made to public hearings in the Council chamber and based on an expensive draft plan. Yet they undoubtably have some very interesting ideas about the outcomes of strategic policies for now and in the future.
Lets be quite clear: WE have developed methods to do this in development projects abroad, yet there are very few people in New Zealand who have the experience and capabilities required to cross sectorally plan for outcomes for now and in the future. So the consultation process wants to hear as many ideas as possible, not just about the process itself, but about on going monitoring and evaluation. Not many in NZ have the capacity to complete reputable cross cutting analyses of indicators, let alone analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data across sectors.
Members of our communities rarely experience their days and lives in neat unrelated sectoral cells. In participating in consultation procedures and in their expectations of outcomes they will expect to see such inter relationships expressed.
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Crosscutting issues outstrip the conventional patterns of thought on which coordination mechanisms have traditionally been based. This poses a problem for the centre. Providing a strategic view of a problem area is part of the role of governance. But Councils usually build that view largely on the basis of information and analysis emanating from line managers. The challenge for the centre is to develop an holistic perspective on crosscutting questions even though the managers themselves may not wish to perceive the full dimensions of the problem. It is also patently obvious that ‘cross cutting’ is another area where New Zealanders may have embraced the rhetoric but seem appallingly incapable of proceeding to analysis. Is this because for example, that a roading engineer thinks that his cost benefit analysis and all his empirical data is just more important and completely unrelated to the qualitative methods used in a participatory impact assessment by the community development group – is it territorial? Is it about the annual budget and job retention? Or is it just ignorance - with a fear of admitting they don’t know how.
Crosscutting policies require organisational support that transcends institutionally defined policy fields. The traditionally vertical, compartmentalised structures tend to limit information flows and to impede coordinated action. It’s all a bit late to think about cross cutting analyses by waiting until the project or proposal gets to the senior management team. The moment you have to specify outcomes, coordination mechanisms need to be designed to overcome vertical structures, and to ensure horizontal consistency among identified policy fields. How well can these mechanisms manage cross-cutting issues that are difficult to circumscribe, especially in a highly interconnected policy context?
As policies become more interconnected, and as the policy context continues to change rapidly, there is a greater risk of incoherence arising among policies during their implementation phase, even among policies that seemed mutually compatible when they were first decided upon. To reduce this risk, governors need to be able to adjust policies as new information is generated from the community in the course of implementation. In order to be responsive to the context, existing mechanisms to coordinate the implementation of policies increasingly need to rely on direct feedback from the community. The log frame – or whatever planning mechanism is used, should have community determined timely feedback loops for such a possibility.
Community governance must also concern itself with the ethics of research and participation: for some this means cultural appropriateness. It was one thing for Council strategic plans to include phrases about ‘acknowledging the Treaty of Waitangi’ – and for many that was as far as it went. The proposal is for a statutory responsibility to ‘acknowledge, value and respond’ to the interests and rights of local citizens and groups of citizens.
For some it means the safety of privacy in making a submission. ‘Identifying community outcomes, priorities, values and preferences’, invites diversity governance to recognise pluralities. ‘Providing local citizens and groups of citizens with choices over the ways their different needs are met and promoted’ includes the way in which they choose to be part of the consultation process. At the recent Local Government conference Minister Sandra Lee noted : A growing number of ethnic groups—some 30 significant groups, including refugee groups—now reside in New Zealand, each with its own characteristics, traditional ways and needs. Community governance means diversity governance. We would not say to the disability community that they are too few in number for us to want to hear from them: no group is too few in number to be left out.
But even the majority can be left out. There are some very slack methods being practiced which assume that putting men and women in the same focus group serves the different values and perceptions of both. It is particularly clear to me that women have very different perceptions of ‘safety’ in a community: they think differently about safety on urban roads, and in storm water drains. They think differently about lighting – of parks and reserves, bus shelters, pedestrian crossings. They will have different standards about environmental health issues – and who should pay. They are likely to have some particular views about the support of local refuge centres by the Council, or alternate provisions or assistance for homeless women or street people. Non gendered community consultation is not good practice.
What does planning for outcomes mean and why will this make a lot of governors nervous? I respond with a cynicism worthy of a former politician: they may have nothing to show immediately for where they have been. The State services Commission has been conducting a pilot on outcomes based indicators with Treasury, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and the Department of Conservation – so we can look there for experience examples and clues. DOC is charged with the evaluation of outputs in terms of measurable conservation outcomes, and to establish strong linkages between the outputs it is reporting on and the ecosystem responses, or outcomes. Let me give you on example. The normal outputs on possum control tell us how many tonnes of bait were dropped and over how many hectares. Actually this is pretty meaningless in accessing the effectiveness of expenditure. What is meaningful is to know that after 5 – 6 years there may be improvement in foliage cover in northern rata; that after 10 years pohutakawa regeneration has improved tenfold. That over 2 or 3 years there may be significant increases in counts of bird species, and significant increases in flowering and fruiting in some palatable plant species.
There is no ‘like’ model of governance to look to for guidance, although there are some good practice indicators from other reports. The Education Review Office report of June 1990, ‘School Government and Student Achievement’ has some interesting observations.
The Education Review Office findings indicate that there is no single answer to the question of what constitutes effective governance in schools. Different boards have established different mechanisms for recognising and dealing with the challenges and issues that confront their schools. In many schools board members have a well developed sense of their governance role and work together constructively to ensure that the skills and expertise of various individuals are brought to bear on relevant decisions and that appropriate working relationships are established with the principal, teachers and school communities.
But in others the review found trustees who have a limited understanding of their governance role; trustees who have no active governance role; trustees who lack the necessary knowledge and management skills; and trustees who have no sense of the need for management systems as a necessary precondition for proper accountability and informed decision making. For ‘trustees we could read ‘councillors and most of us could name names.
The ERO reported that new strategies would need to focus not just on the inputs to schooling (the level of resources etc) but also on improving the processes within the schools, including the quality of governance and management.
The key, we can see, is in the processes that are adopted at each point and on each occasion. How do such processes guard against “special interest capture” and ensure that decisions reflect the broad public interest? How can local government promote both efficient and inclusive consultation without unduly slowing down or stalling policy-making processes?
A rigorous and energetic consultation process should shift and break down boundaries and conceptual categories. It should challenge rigidities in policy-making systems, and monitoring and evaluation systems (if there are any in place) and seek ways to make them more flexible and participatory.
The needed approach makes some characters very anxious. Real community consultation and participation is a threat to their personal power, and to what they misguidedly believe is the ‘expertise’ they can assume with the office they hold. It is a process that can take people well beyond their comfort zone. Alternatively it can be a process of real wonderment and celebration, strategic challenge, and seen as a real privilege of the best of informal educational opportunities.
Those people, who know it all (to obscure their lack of knowledge and the threat to their power), will at this point strive for a process governed by rules and pre determined agendas for ‘coherent outcomes’. Excessive efforts to enhance coherence can result in a high degree of central control, and a consequent loss of flexibility in the policy-making system.
There is always a gap between some need for coherence and the capacity to achieve it.
Governing in a democratic political system necessarily involves a degree of incoherence. Interest groups seek to shape public policy in ways which, taken as a whole, serve disparate ends.
Opinion polls bring contradictory short-term pressures to bear on longer-term policy direction. ( Opinion polls are not participatory monitoring and evaluation)! Seen in that light, good policymaking is less a question of avoiding contradiction than one of managing it. This implies that policy-making systems must increase their capacity to balance and reconcile divergent pressures.
The information media can mobilise public opinion, and create expectations of quick responses. It should of course always be remembered that the media are there to sell their product. They know who their market is. They are not there to educate the public, or to promote diversity governance. I am daily shocked at the naivety of those who think otherwise.
There nevertheless exist good practices and “tools of coherence”. They concern the process of policymaking, not the substance of policies. However, they are premised on the notion that the process by which policies are made and implemented has a determining effect on substantive policy outcomes. They reflect three key needs, dictated by the fast-changing contemporary policy environment: the need for a strong strategic capacity at the centre of council; the need for organisational flexibility; and the need for effective information gathering and processing systems.
The paramount tool of coherence is informed decision-making. What matters most is not simply whether contrasted policies are being pursued, but whether they are being pursued knowingly, or unwittingly. If contradictory decisions must be made, the key concern is that they be made lucidly, deliberately, and on the basis of information and analysis that enable the decision takers to mitigate the costs of incoherence, as well as to explain their course of action in the context of the difficult choices they are confronted with. A high premium is therefore put on developing information systems and analytical capacities. There is no place for the bulldozer approach, or for the withholding of any information, however much it might seem to muddy the waters.
What about the CEO? What part does he or she play: in best practice community governance? He or she can filter information both ways - to staff and to councillors. Transparency is the best practice, with some very good boundaries
In both directions there is the easy possibility of capture of the councilors in policy formulation: in fact much of policy formulation is already pre determined by the choices made about the processes to be adopted for community consultation. The whole process is easily captured by staff. And there will be tremendous obstruction and resistance to the new processes. Those who have been consumed with outputs will be very put out that they must now plan for outcomes. Many if not most involved will not know how to do this, and they will not know how to establish a participatory framework for monitoring and evaluation based on smart objectives. At the point where the number crunching ( and much of that has been meaningless – even for outputs) stops, they are likely to criticise the legislative requirements.
Alternatively they might call in the consultant. In the area of community consultation local government in New Zealand has been rather too dependent on the outside consultants with their jargon and the one size fits all scenarios with the template in the computer to fill in the gaps. In the world of research we marvel at what I describe as the six degrees of separation. We know in the physical and social sciences that the further the research is from the analysis and final use the more unreliable it is. So someone drafts a tender document and a consultant who lives outside the area has the cheapest tender. One degree. They propose a telephone survey, some focus groups, and some key informant interviews with key stakeholders. Two degrees. The consultant analyses the data and writes the report. Three degrees. The middle managers get it and reinterpret it for the senior team. Four degrees. The senior team choose bits of it to suit the prepared strategy and write the report for the CEO. Five degrees. The 2 page key points analysis is fed to the Council - six degrees - who for very good reasons – since it is not, by now, in any way related to good community governance and consultation – ignore it.
I do not expect that the staff of councils are trained or have the expertise to take all the steps that will be required by good governance, but they are much better to be mentored in good practice and be as close to the sources of information than to waste money on this stuff. One part of the picture that is always missing – and it is amazing to me – is that participatory community governance means participatory community analysis. Those of us who work in the development field are amazed by the differences between the field work required by the New Zealand government in its development projects – which is exacting and rigorous and where we have developed tools where substantial areas of mainly illiterate people are engaged in the front line of analysis of disparate data – and the proposition in the practices at home that we don’t have the time or the capacity for this.
A small example: a respondent gaps analysis is a key part of the framework: when the data is in, what groups are missing – and how do we get to them? Only when this is attempted can we begin the next step. Some government agencies are trying to promote better practice in the area. I am aware of the recent launch of The Tool Kit – Te Kete Awhina – A Planning Tool for Community Consultation and Quality Decision Making in Local Authorities, by the Hilary Commission and Creative New Zealand.
I see the proposed changes to Local Government as enormously exciting: They come when the Ministry for the Environment is close to completing their environmental indicators project: when the Ministry of Social Policy has published its first Social Policy indicators, when some of our major cities have completed extensive quality of life surveys, when the country had completed its first time use survey, and when we all are learning that partnership does not mean making the same space for tangata whenua to do it our way:: that the 21st century means the miles to be walked to partnership are now for the pakeha to walk.
It means difference, divergence, diversity. It means the healthiest possible democracy, where politicians will have to exercise transparent choices over different data bases and conflicting values to deliver outcomes for well being – now and in the future.
It makes me excited – it makes me want to party on behalf of the possibilities for an Aotearoa so potentially enriched and healthy in its politics.
It even makes the prospect of living in Rodney seem reasonable!
